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Abstract. In this paper we attack round-reduced Keccak hash function with a technique called
rotational cryptanalysis. We focus on Keccak variants proposed as SHA-3 candidates in the NIST’s
contest for a new standard of cryptographic hash function. Our main result is a preimage attack on
4-round Keccak and a 5-round distinguisher on Keccak-f [1600] permutation — the main building
block of Keccak hash function.
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1 Introduction
In 2007, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced a public
contest aiming at the selection of a new standard for a cryptographic hash function. The main
motivation behind starting the contest has been the security flaws identified in the SHA-1 stan-
dard in 2005. Similarities between SHA-1 and the most recent standard SHA-2 were worrisome
and NIST decided that a new, stronger hash function would be needed. Overall, 51 functions
were submitted to the first round of the contest. In July 2009 out of the submitted functions,
14 were selected to the second round. At the end of 2010, the five finalists were announced
and eventually in October 2012 the winner has been selected. The new SHA-3 standard will be
Keccak hash function [5]. In this paper we analyze Keccak using a technique called rotational
cryptanalysis.
Rotational analysis is a relatively new type of attack. The technique was mentioned and
applied in [2, 14, 16], and formally introduced in [12]. Unlike the differential analysis, where for a
pair (x, y) the attacker follows the propagation of the difference x⊕y through the cryptographic
system, in the rotational analysis, the adversary investigates the propagation of the rotational
relations through the cryptographic transformations. Khovratovich and Nikolic´ in [12] analyze
the primitives composed of only three operations: addition, rotation, xor (ARX). For these prim-
itives, they prove that the probability that a rotational pair of inputs will produce a rotational
pair on the output depends on the number of additions only. In [17] a rotational distinguisher
was designed for the keyed permutation of the Shabal hash function. Rotational cryptanalysis
was combined with the rebound attack and applied to the compression function of the SHA-3
candidate Skein and its underlying cipher Threefish [13].
The known cryptanalytic results on Keccak can be divided into two types. The first type
is showing a non-random behaviour, weakness in the Keccak’s internal permutation, such
as our rotational distinguishers. The second type is attacking the core security properties of
the whole function (a preimage attack and a collision attack). The distinguisher of Keccak’s
permutation with the highest number of rounds is the zero-sum distinguisher proposed in [1] and
later improved in [6, 9]. However, the complexity of these distinguishers is very high. For example,
the zero-sum distinguisher for all 24 rounds has the complexity of 21579. A differential analysis
of Keccak’s internal permutation, given in [10], leads to distinguishers up to 8 rounds with
complexity of 2491.47 and for 5 rounds with complexity of 28. Among the attacks on the Keccak
hash function, the most rounds were reached by Bernstein in his 8-round preimage attack [3].
However, the attack is much slower than parallel exhaustive search and it is inherently memory-
intensive. Also with the aid of differential analysis, Naya-Plasencia et al. mounted the preimage
and collision attacks on 2-round Keccak [15]. In [11] the same result (2-round preimage and
2-round collision attacks) were obtained through the SAT-based attacks. The most successful
collision attack was given in [8] where 4-round collisions were presented.
In this paper we focus our analysis on the Keccak variants proposed as SHA-3 candidates.
First we analyze the permutation Keccak-f [1600]. We mount the 4-round rotational distin-
guisher and then enhance it with a correlation analysis which improves the result to 5 rounds.
We implement the distinguishers and verify the experimental results. Unlike the other rotational
analysis we treat rotational relations between bits independently and we operate on probabil-
ities of rotational relations. Our rotational cryptanalysis not only serves as a mean to show a
non-random behaviour in the cryptographic primitive, but also for the first time the technique
is used for mounting the preimage attack. A family of 4-round distinguishers is the base for our
4-round preimage attack with the complexity 64 times lower than exhaustive search. This is also
the first 4-round preimage attack with a negligible amount of memory needed for the attack.
Table 1. Best known preimage attacks on the Keccak variants proposed as SHA-3 candidates. The number in
the column ‘Variant’ denotes a hash length.
Rounds Variant Time Memory Reference
6/7/8 512 2506/2507/2511.5 2176/2320/2508 [3]
4 224/256 2217.3/2249.3 261 [3]∗
4 384/512 2377.3/2505.3 261 [3]∗
4 512 2506 negligible Section 4.2
4 384 2378 negligible Section 4.2
4 256 2252 negligible Section 4.2
4 224 2221 negligible Section 4.2
2 KECCAK
In this section we provide a description of Keccak to the extent necessary for understanding
the attack described in the paper. For a complete specification, we refer the interested reader to
the original specification [5].
Keccak uses the sponge construction and hence is a member of the sponge function family
[4]. Figure 1 shows the construction. It can be used as a hash function but also can be applied
for generating infinite bit stream, making it suitable as a stream cipher or a pseudorandom bit
generator. In this paper we focus on the sponge construction for cryptographic hashing. Keccak
has two main parameters r and c, which are called bitrate and capacity, respectively. The sum
of those two makes the state size, which Keccak operates on. For the SHA-3 proposal, the
state size is 1600 bits. Different values for bitrate and capacity give the trade-off between speed
and security. The higher bitrate gives the faster function that is less secure. Keccak follows the
sponge two-phase processing.
The initial 1600-bit state is filled with 0’s. In the first phase (also called the absorbing phase),
interleaved with applications of the permutation f (called Keccak-f in the specification). The
∗These results were provided for us by the author of the attack. Originally in [3] the results are given only for
6,7 and 8 rounds.
Fig. 1. Sponge Construction [4]
absorbing phase is finished when all message blocks have been processed. In the second phase
(also called the squeezing phase), the first r bits of the state are returned as part of the output
bits, interleaved with applications of the function f . The squeezing phase is finished after the
desired length of output digest has been produced.
For the variants proposed as SHA-3 candidates, the value of the parameter c is equal to a hash
length multiplied by 2. For example, the SHA-3 candidate with 512-bit hash length is Keccak
with c = 1024 and r = 576 (r + c = 1600). In this paper we denote variants proposed as SHA-3
candidates by Keccak-512, Keccak-384, Keccak-256, and Keccak-224. (The number is a
hash length for a given variant.)
Keccak can also operate on smaller states but through the whole paper we always refer to
the default variant with 1600-bit state. The state can be visualised as an array of 5×5 lanes,
each lane is 64-bit long. The state size determines the number of rounds in Keccak-f function.
For the default 1600-bit state there are 24 rounds. All rounds are the same except for constants
which are different for each round.
Below there is a pseudo-code of a single round. In the latter part of the paper, we often refer
to the algorithm steps (denoted by Greek letters) described in the following pseudo-code.
Round(A,RC) {
θ step
C[x] = A[x,0] xor A[x,1] xor A[x,2] xor
A[x,3] xor A[x,4], forall x in (0...4)
D[x] = C[x-1] xor rot(C[x+1],1), forall x in (0...4)
A[x,y] = A[x,y] xor D[x], forall (x,y) in (0...4,0...4)
ρ step forall (x,y) in (0...4,0...4)
A[x,y] = rot(A[x,y], r[x,y]),
pi step forall (x,y) in (0...4,0...4)
B[y,2*x+3*y] = A[x,y],
χ step forall (x,y) in (0...4,0...4)
A[x,y] = B[x,y] xor ((not B[x+1,y]) and B[x+2,y]),
ι step
A[0,0] = A[0,0] xor RC
return A }
All the operations on the indices shown in the pseudo-code are done modulo 5. A denotes the
complete permutation state array and A[x,y] denotes a particular lane in that state. B[x,y],
C[x], D[x] are 64-bit intermediate variables. The constants r[x,y] are the rotation offsets,
while RC are the round constants. rot(W,m) is the usual bitwise rotation operation, moving bit
at position i into position i+m in lane W (i+m are done modulo 64 – note that 64 is the lane
size for the default variant of Keccak). θ is the linear operation intends to provide diffusion
for the state. ρ is a permutation between bits in the lanes and pi is a permutation between
the whole lanes. The only non-linear operation is χ which can be treated as a layer of 5-bit
Sboxes. Finally, ι xores the round constant with the first lane. The constants play a vital role
in our analysis and it is worth mentioning that they have the very low Hamming weight. The
constants for the first 5 rounds are: 0000000000000001, 0000000000008082, 800000000000808a,
8000000080008000, 000000000000808b (given respectively in hexadecimal using the little-endian
format).
In our work we often need to refer to a particular bit of the state and we do that by A(x,y,z).
The coordinates x, y range from 0 to 4 specifying the lane in the state and the coordinate z
ranges from 0 to 63 specifying the bit number in the given lane. With this notation we can refer
to a state by A, to a lane by A(3,2), to a value of a single bit by A(1,4,6), or to a position of a
single bit by (3, 1, 60).
3 Rotational distinguishers for the Keccak-f [1600] permutation
In our analysis we follow the relation between two states (A,A←) which change through subse-
quent steps of Keccak-f [1600] permutation. In particular we are interested in evolution of a
rotational pair of states. Let us define the rotational pair in the context of the Keccak-f [1600]
permutation.
Definition 1. A pair of two 1600-bit states (A, A←) is called a rotational pair when each lane
in the state A← is created by bitwise rotation operation of the corresponding lane in the state
A. The operation moves the bit from the position (x, y, z) to the position (x, y, z + n), where
z + n is done modulo 64. The coordinates x, y range from 0 to 4 specifying the lane in the
state and the coordinate z ranges from 0 to 63 specifying the bit number in the given lane.
n is called a rotational number and is the same for every lane. Thus in the rotational pair
∀(x, y, z) : A(x,y,z) = A←(x,y,z+n).
Remark 1. Following Definition 1, there are up to 64 possible rotational pairs including a pair,
where A and A← are the same (having n = 0). We will use this fact in the preimage attack
described later in the paper.
In some parts of this work we are interested in the probability that a given pair is a rota-
tional one or a given pair of corresponding bits preserve the rotational relation. Two following
definitions help to formally define this probability.
Definition 2. Set Sn is a set of 2
1600 pairs of states which are created by an operation (some
number of steps of Keccak-f [1600] or their inverse) applied to all possible rotational pairs. (All
possible means 21600 possible rotational pairs for a chosen rotational number n.)
Definition 3. Probability pn(x,y,z) is the probability that for a pair of states (A, A
←) randomly
selected from the set Sn we have A(x,y,z) 6= A←(x,y,z+n).
pn(x,y,z) can be expressed as p
n
(x,y,z) = 1/2 + 
n
(x,y,z). Therefore if 
n
(x,y,z) = 1/2, the corresponding
bits have opposite values and if n(x,y,z) = −1/2, the corresponding bits are equal. In case n(x,y,z) =
0, the bits are independent.
Fig. 2. Probabilistic relation between bits in a pair of states (A, A←)
A (x,y,z+n)(x,y,z)A =Pr( )(x,y,z)p =
Operation ......input
Operation ......rotated input A (x,y,z+n)
A (x,y,z)
n
When mounting distinguishers we refer to a random permutation which now we define for-
mally.
Given a permutation of n-bit sequences, i.e p : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. The collection of all
permutations over n bit sequences is denoted by Pn. The cardinality of the set Pn is n!.
Definition 4. Given a probability distribution Dn that assigns the probability 1n! for each per-
mutation p ∈ Pn. A permutation is called random if it is chosen according to the (uniform)
distribution Dn.
For a random permutation we assume that pn(x,y,z) follows the binomial distribution B(t, s)
where t is a number of trials and s is a probability of success and is equal to 0.5. The mean for
the binomial distribution equals s · t and the standard deviation σ =√(1− s)s · t .
To distinguish Keccak-f [1600] permutation from a random permutation we check whether
the experimental results (for a chosen p(x,y,z) follow the binomial distribution B(t, 0.5). We choose
a typical 95% confidence interval and hence the mean from the experimental sample should be
within the range 0.5t±2σ. If the mean is beyond that range we conclude that experimental results
do not follow the binomial distribution B(t, 0.5) and hence Keccak-f [1600] can be distinguished
from a random permutation.
To calculate how the probabilities change through the successive steps of the algorithm, let
us first analyze two basic bitwise operations used in Keccak.
For the following Lemmas it is assumed that each p(x,y,z) is independent. Also we assume
that if corresponding bits from (A, A←) are equal, both combinations (‘00’ or ‘11’) have the
same probability to be the actual values. The same applies for combinations with opposite bits
(‘01’ or ‘10’).
Lemma 1 (AND). Given the bitwise AND operation, its input bits a, b and the output bit out.
Then the probability
Pout =
1
2
(pa + pb − papb),
where the probabilities pa and pb are defined according to Definition 3.
Lemma 2 (XOR). Given the bitwise XOR operation, its input bits a, b and the output bit out.
Then the probability
Pout = pa + pb − 2papb,
where the probabilities pa and pb are defined according to Definition 3.
Proofs of the lemmas are given in Appendix.
There is also the bitwise NOT operation in the algorithm but it does not affect the proba-
bilities. NOT flips the values of the corresponding bits A(x,y,z) and A
←
(x,y,z+n) but their relation
(or precisely speaking the probability of relation pn(x,y,z)) remains unchanged. Also the bitwise
rotation operation (denoted in the pseudo-code as rot(W,n)) does not change the values of
probabilities. It rotates the bits in the lane so their positions (coordinates z in pn(x,y,z)) change
while their probabilities pn(x,y,z) are not changed.
Having explained how the basic bitwise operations change the rotation probabilities, the
analysis of the Keccak-f [1600] steps remains mostly straightforward. In the transformation
θ, there is the XOR operation only, applied a number of times. Due to the linearity of the
XOR operation, the repeated application of Lemma 2 will give the correct results of calculated
probabilities. For the permutations ρ and pi, nothing needs to be calculated as only the positions
of bits change. In the transformation χ, the two Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 are applied. The last
step is the transformation ι, where the lane (0,0) is xored with a constant. Xoring with ‘0’ does
not change anything. However, if there is ‘1’ at position m in the constant and a rotational
number n > 0, then xoring with a constant change the probabilities as follows
pn(0,0,m) := 1− pn(0,0,m) and
pn(0,0,m−n) := 1− pn(0,0,m−n)
Example 1. Let us consider two 8-bit lanes A(0,0) and A
←
(0,0) with the rotational number n = 3.
The lanes have the following binary values: A(0,0) = 00000010 and A
←
(0,0) = 00010000. Because
∀z: A(0,0,z) = A←(0,0,z+3), then ∀z: p3(x,y,z) = 0 (according to Definition 3). Now if both lanes
are xored with 8-bit constant C = 00000001, new values of lanes are A(0,0) = 00000011 and
A←(0,0) = 00010001. Rotational relation has been spoilt at two positions (0 and 5), therefore the
probabilities p3(0,0,0) and p
3
(0,0,5) are now equal to 1. In Keccak-f [1600] the constants are 64-bit
long but the reasoning shown above is still valid.
3.1 4-round distinguishers
We build a 4-round rotational distinguisher and show that after 4 rounds, there are some co-
ordinates (x, y, z) and the rotational number n for which pn(x,y,z) does not follow the binomial
distribution B(t, 0.5). Figure 3 illustrates an evolution of rotation probabilities. A single square
represents a value (or a range of values) of the probability pn(x,y,z). Usually in this paper, we refer
to a lane by its two coordinates (x, y). However here for the sake of diagram readability instead
of 5x5 matrix of lanes there are 25 rows, each representing a single lane. For example, a value of
pn(0,1,0) is represented by the leftmost square in the sixth row and p
n
(4,4,63) is represented by the
rightmost square in the last (25th) row.
In the beginning, all corresponding bits from a rotational pair are equal so ∀(x, y, z) pn(x,y,z) =
0. After the first application of ι, some probabilities pn(x,y,z) change and in the subsequent steps
these changes propagate and influence other bits. For most rotational numbers n, there are
some probabilities pn(x,y,z) deviating from 0.5 until the end of the 4th round. According to our
calculations, at the end of 4th round the probability p54(4,4,14) = 0.5625. To verify the distinguisher
we chose randomly 10000 rotational pairs and ran them on the 4-round Keccak-f [1600]. The
mean from that sample was equal to 5682 (for 5682 rotational pairs bits had different values). For
a random permutation which follows the binomial distribution B(10000, 0.5), the mean equals
5000 and the standard deviation equals 50. Thus the mean from the experiment on the 4-round
Keccak-f [1600] should be within the range 5000± 2 · 50 and clearly 5682 is beyond that range.
Hence we conclude we have a distinguisher for the 4-round Keccak-f [1600] permutation.
We could not directly extend the distinguisher to 5 rounds because after θ in the 5th round
all pn(x,y,z) = 0.5.
3.2 Extension to 5-round distinguisher
To extend the distinguisher to 5 rounds, we show that correlation between some corresponding
bits from A and A← deviates from what is expected from random permutation. Let us first give
an observation which helps to mount the 5-round distinguisher.
Observation 1 Consider two bits (A(x,y,z), A(x,y′,z)) from state A which are in the same col-
umn and let us assume that we know the probability that A(x,y,z) 6= A(x,y′,z)). Our point is that
θ does not change this probability. It is because θ treats each bit within a column in the same
way: either it flips all 5 of them or it leaves them unchanged.
We can use this observation in our rotational analysis. The difference is that now we look
at relations in one pair (A(x,y,z), A
←
(x,y,z+n)) and the second pair (A(x,y′,z), A
←
(x,y′,z+n)). Each of
these two pairs has the relation between its bits (that is bits have either the same or opposite
values). We are interested whether the relations are the same in both pairs, specifically the
probability that relations are the same in both pairs. For a random permutation this probability
has the binomial distribution B(t, 0.5). If we can show that for the 5-round Keccak-f [1600]
experimental results do not follow this distribution, then we have a distinguisher.
First we determine a rotational number n for which pn(x,y,z) and p
n
(x,y′,z) have the highest
deviation from 0.5 at the end of the 4th round. It turns out that for n = 63, p63(2,1,37) and p
63
(2,2,37)
is the best pair? (p63(2,1,37) = 0.5625 and p
63
(2,2,37) = 0.49219).
Now let Pc denotes a probability that in the first pair (A(x,y,z), A
←
(x,y,z+n)) and in the second
pair (A(x,y′,z), A
←
(x,y′,z+n)) is the same relation. That is the probability:
Pc = p
n
(x,y,z) · pn(x,y′,z) + (1− pn(x,y,z))(1− pn(x,y′,z))
We can calculate Pc for the chosen pair p
63
(2,1,37) and p
63
(2,2,37).
Pc = 0.5625 · 0.49219 + (1− 0.5625)(1− 0.49219) = 0.49902375
This is the Pc value at the beginning of the 5th round. Then we have to examine how the
steps in the algorithm change this probability. As explained in Observation 1, θ does not change
this value. Subsequent algorithm steps ρ and pi also do not change Pc value, they only change
a position of Pc which now refers to different pairs of bits (A(1,2,43), A
←
(1,2,44)) and (A(2,0,16),
A←(2,0,17)). After that there is χ which preserves the relation between the first pair and the
second with a probability equals 0.53125. The reason that this value deviates from 0.5 is that χ
is a non-linear operation and precisely the bitwise AND operation which introduces the bias. All
the details on how this value is calculated are given in Appendix. Finally, ι does not affect our
? An anonymous reviewer pointed that a better pair can be found, that is p31(0,0,3) and p
31
(0,2,3). It improves the
distinguisher by a factor of 4.
Fig. 3. Evolution of probabilities p53(x,y,z) through 4 rounds of Keccak-f [1600].
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analysis here. Therefore, to have our pairs with the same relation at the end of the 5th round,
there are two ways this event may occur. Either the pairs enter into the 5th round with the
same relation and χ does not spoil it or they enter into the 5th round with the opposite relation
and χ ‘fixes’ it. Then the total probability Pc for the chosen pair at the end of the 5th round is:
Pc = 0.53125 · 0.49902375 + (1− 0.53125) · (1− 0.49902375) = 0.499938984
For a random permutation, Pc follows the binomial distribution with the probability of
success s = 0.5 — very close to 0.499938984. Then the bias for 5-round Keccak-f [1600] is
expected to be very small. To experimentally verify and observe the bias we need to check many
rotational pairs. A sufficient number of rotational pairs m is calculated from Chernoff bound [7]
and can be expressed as the following inequality:
m ≥ 1
(Pc − 0.5)2 ln
1√

,
where  is the probability of an error of the bound (typically set to 0.05). From the inequality
we have m ≥ 402 332 890 ≈ 228.6 and in the experiment we checked 403 000 000 rotational pairs.
The distinguisher we implemented can be described in a few short steps:
1. Generate randomly 403 000 000 rotational pairs
2. For each pair
(a) Run 5-round Keccak-f [1600] on the state A and the state A←;
(b) if (A(1,2,43) ⊕A←(1,2,44) ⊕A(2,0,16) ⊕A←(2,0,17) = 0) then
mean := mean+ 1;
The mean from the experiment was equal to 201 450 503. For a random permutation which fol-
lows the binomial distribution B(403 000 000, 0.5), the mean equals 201 500 000 and the standard
deviation equals 10 037. Thus the mean from the experiment on the 5-round Keccak-f [1600]
should be within the range 201 500 000± 2 · 10 037 and 201 450 503 is beyond that range. Hence
we conclude we have a distinguisher for the 5-round Keccak-f [1600] permutation.
3.3 5-round distinguisher with lower complexity
The idea allowing us to reduce the complexity of the 5-round distinguisher is to start not from a
rotational pair of states but from the pair of states (called ‘good’ states) which after one round
gives the rotational pair. First diagram in Figure 4 shows the structure which is used to generate
a pair of ‘good’ states. Now we explain how we construct this structure. (A rotational number
n is set to 63 in the following explanation but for any other n the logic of construction stays the
same.)
On the way to the rotational pair from a pair of ‘good’ states the following should happen:
• ι from the first round flips the value of p63(0,0,0) and p63(0,0,1). Thus to get the rotational pair
after ι, there have to be p63(0,0,0) = 1, p
63
(0,0,1) = 1 and for all other p
63
(x,y,z) = 0 before ι step.
• We want that p63(0,0,0) = 1, p63(0,0,1) = 1 and all other p63(x,y,z) = 0 are going to χ and χ does not
change any of p63(x,y,z). This way ι gets the right p
63
(x,y,z) to produce the rotational pair.
However χ is a non-linear operation and to have the condition fulfilled, some A(x,y,z) and
A←(x,y,z+n) have to be fixed. To have values fixed at this point it has to be taken under consid-
eration at the beginning of the first round. Once we know the relation of the states A and A←
before χ step, it is easy to go back till the beginning of the round. It is because pi, ρ and θ are
all linear operations and they change the rotational relation with probability 1. Thus we simply
Fig. 4. 1-round transition to a rotational pair. A rotational number n set to 63.
p = 0
p = 1
fixed value
θ, ρ, pi
χ, ι
invert these three operations to get the rotational relation at the beginning of the first round.
Figure 4 shows a 1-round transition to a rotational pair where exact positions of the fixed bits
are marked. The values of fixed bits which lead to this transition are given in Appendix.
We hoped that this 1-round transition to a rotational pair would give one more round in
the distinguisher. However it is not the case and the problem is that the constant of the second
round has the Hamming weight 3 (and not 1 as for the first round). More 1’s in the round
constant introduce more pn(x,y,z) = 1 which subsequently cause more p
n
(x,y,z) with undesirable
value of 0.5. Yet this 1-round transition can be used to lower the complexity of the 5-round
distinguisher. Similarly as in the distinguisher from the previous section, we are interested in
the pair of pn(x,y,z) at the end of 4th round which are in the same column and whose values
deviate from 0.5. For a rotational number n set to 63, we find an excellent pair where both
p63(4,3,22) and p
63
(4,4,22) are equal to 0. We calculate Pc in exactly the same way as in Section 3.2
but this time the total probability Pc is much higher and is equal to 0.53125. Putting this value
to the Chernoff inequality, we calculate the number of pairs m needed to detect the bias and
obtain m ≥ 1534 ≈ 211 . Around 211 needed pairs make the complexity of the distinguisher
roughly equal 212.
Trying to win more rounds by ‘going backwards’ by 2 (or more) rounds is problematic. Either
we end up with all fixed bits at the beginning of the distinguisher (then in fact is not a structural
distinguisher any more), or if we assume that transitions can be probabilistic the complexity of
the distinguisher becomes much higher than the complexity of the generic ‘attack’. We also tried
the approach where each undesirable pn(x,y,z) = 0.5 becomes 0 with probability 2
−1. However, we
could not reach anything better than 5 rounds without exceeding the generic complexity.
4 Preimage attacks on round-reduced Keccak
First, we describe the preimage attack on 3-round Keccak-512 which is based on the rotational
distinguisher given in the previous section. Then we show how to extend the attack to 4 rounds.
To have the attack working on Keccak hash function, we have to consider padding and Keccak
parameters. Let us consider Keccak-512 which has r = 576, c = 1024 and a hash length set to
512 bits. For the preimage attack we propose the following structure of the message. A message
length is 574 bits, where first 8 lanes (512 bits) are unknown (to be determined by the attacker).
Last 62 bits of the message are set to 1. The message is padded with two 1’s giving a block of
576 bits. This way we fulfil a condition that all lanes (except first 8 lanes) have all 0’s or 1’s. We
would use similar constraints on a message when attacking Keccak with different parameters
(including all Keccak variants proposed as SHA-3 candidates).
4.1 3-round preimage attack
The goal of our attack is to find a preimage for a given 512-bit hash h. In the structure of
the message described above we have 512 unknown bits, then we can expect that among 2512
possible messages there is, on average, one with a given hash. The main idea of our attack is to
find a rotational counterpart of the preimage and show that the workload for this task is below
exhaustively trying all 2512 values. Once we have a rotational counterpart of the preimage, we
simply rotate it back and get the preimage.
As stated in Remark 1, for a given state there are up to 64 possible rotational pairs (including
the identity function). There are 512 unknown preimage bits in the state A, then the probability
that we guess one of the rotational counterpart A← is 2−512 · 64 = 2−506. Thus we need 2506
guesses. There is a subtlety here which should be mentioned. There are some messages which
have fewer than 64 rotations. These ‘special’ messages have a cyclic pattern. For example a
message starting with four 0’s then four 1’s, then four 0’s and so on. However, the number of
‘special’ messages is relatively small in comparison to 2512. It can be shown there are 2256 such
messages for our case. (See Appendix for detailed analysis.) For simplicity, we can start our
attack with checking 2256 these special messages. Then there are still almost 2512 possibilities
left, but at least we are sure that in this poll each state gives 64 rotational pairs.
To make our attack working, at the end of the 3rd round we need some pn(x,y,z) = 0 or
pn(x,y,z) = 1 for each rotational number n. In the precomputation phase of the attack we generate
64 diagrams (the same as shown in Figure 3), each with a different rotational number n. From
these diagrams for each rotational number n we make a list of 10 sets of coordinates (x, y, z) for
which pn(x,y,z) equals 0 or 1 at the end of the 3rd round. Please note that we have to consider
only (x, y, z) such that 64x+ 320y+ z < 512 because the attacker knows only 512 bits of a hash
(not the whole 1600-bit state).
Here is the main loop of the attack given in the following pseudo-code:
1. guess first 8 lanes (512 bits) of the state A←, the other bits are fixed according to the
structure of the message given above.
2. run 3-round Keccak-f [1600] on the state A←.
3. for n := 0 to n < 64 do
(a) candidate := true;
(b) for all 10 sets of coordinates (x, y, z) being on the list created in precomputation do
if (pn(x,y,z) = 0) and (A(x,y,z) 6= A←(x,y,z+n)) then candidate := false;
if (pn(x,y,z) = 1) and (A(x,y,z) = A
←
(x,y,z+n)) then candidate := false;
(c) if (candidate=true) then rotate back the guessed state by n bits and run 3-round
Keccak-512 on it to check whether the state is the preimage of a given hash.
The attacker compares the probabilities pn(x,y,z) from the distinguisher with the actual values
of A (the given hash) and A← state (a result of 3-round Keccak-512 on a guessed state). So,
for example, if pn(2,3,1) = 0, then the bits A(2,3,1) and A
←
(2,3,1+n) have to be the same. If the bits are
different, then the candidate is rejected as a potential rotational counterpart of the preimage.
(It is the point in the pseudo-code where a variable candidate becomes false.)
As said earlier, running the main loop 2506 times, we should get one rotational counterpart of
the preimage. It could be the case that our guess (candidate) of a rotational counterpart is not
rejected, but in fact it is not a rotational counterpart. Let us call it a false positive candidate.
There will be many such false positive candidates and the number of them is calculated as follows.
For each rotational number n there is a list of 10 sets of (x, y, z) (created in precomputation)
for which pn(x,y,z) equals 0 or 1. A probability that we hit on a candidate for which all 10 values
of pn(x,y,z) are the same as on the list is 2
−10. Hence there will be around 2512/210 = 2502 false
positive candidates to check.
Now let us analyze the workload of inner loops. For each candidate there are 64 rotational
numbers n, and for each n there are 10 sets of coordinates to check. Checking one set of coor-
dinates can be implemented with 3 bitwise XOR operations. So the workload of inner loops is
roughly 64 ·10 ·3 = 1920 XOR operations. This workload is negligibly small as in the single step
θ (in a single round) there are 3200 bitwise XOR operations.
Summing up, the workload of the attack is 2256 (checking special messages) + 2506 (main
loop) + 2502 (checking false positive candidates). Thus complexity of the attack is roughly 2506
Keccak-512 calls, 64 times better than the exhaustive search.
4.2 Extension to 4-round preimage attack
A direct extension of the attack to 4 rounds is not possible since there are not any pn(x,y,z) = 0
or pn(x,y,z) = 1 at the end of the 4th round of the rotational distinguisher. (As said earlier, we
need some pn(x,y,z) equals 0 or 1 for mounting the attack.)
It is easy to notice from Figure 3 that ι flips some pn(0,0,z) and in consequence it leads to
undesirable pn(x,y,z) = 0.5. Then if we could limit this effect, hopefully some p
n
(x,y,z) = 0 or
pn(x,y,z) = 1 would be kept till the end of the 4th round and make the attack work for 4 rounds.
To realize this, we do the following. We trace the rotational relations between A and A← (as
in previous sections), but this time A← is run on the modified version of Keccak-f [1600] —
Keccak-f [1600] without ι. Such a modification leads to the following observation.
Observation 2 In Example 1, Section 3 it was shown that application of ι to A and A← states
flips the value pn(x,y,z) for some triples (x, y, z). Our point is that if we do not apply ι to an A
←
state, there will be half as many flips. (It is not a general rule but for constants with very low
Hamming weight there are roughly half as many flips.) Let us see a simple example.
Example 2. Let us consider two 8-bit lanes A(0,0) and A
←
(0,0) with the rotational number n = 3.
The lanes have the following binary values: A(0,0) = 00000010 and A
←
(0,0) = 00010000. Now
A(0,0) is xored with 8-bit constant C = 00000001 and A
←
(0,0) is left without changes. Then we
have A(0,0) = 00000011 and the unchanged A
←
(0,0) = 00010000. Therefore a rotational relation has
been spoilt at only one position so now p3(0,0,0) is equal to 1. In Keccak-f [1600] the constants
are 64-bit long but the reasoning shown here stays the same.
Now is the key point. As stated earlier, fewer flips lead to fewer pn(x,y,z) with undesirable 0.5
value. In consequence, now in the 4th round there are 9 triples (x, y, z) for which pn(x,y,z) = 0 or
pn(x,y,z) = 1. These triples fulfil the condition 64x+ 320y + z < 512 as the attacker is given only
512 bits of a hash. In fact pn(x,y,z) = 0 or p
n
(x,y,z) = 1 are not at the end of the 4th round but
before χ in the 4th round. (Step χ destroys these desirable probabilities.) Fortunately, we can
invert ι and χ from the given hash as χ operates on the rows independently and can be inverted
on a row-by-row basis. In Appendix we give a diagram showing how the probabilities pn(x,y,z)
evolve and propagate in the modified version of Keccak-f [1600] without ι.
In precomputation phase we generate the list of sets of coordinates in the very similar way as
described for the 3-round attack. The only difference is that now we use the diagram dedicated
to the modified version of Keccak-f [1600] (without ι). The diagram and exact positions where
pn(x,y,z) equals 0 or 1 is given in Appendix. Also in precomputation we invert ι and χ of the 4th
round from the given hash (since these desirable pn(x,y,z) are before χ in the 4th round, χ destroys
them). The result of the inversion is now our state A to which we refer in the pseudo-code of
the attack.
Here is the main loop of the attack given in the following pseudo-code:
1. guess first 8 lanes (512 bits) of the state A←, the other bits are fixed according to the
structure of the message given above.
2. run 4-round modified Keccak-f [1600] on the state A←
3. for n := 0 to n < 64 do
(a) candidate := true;
(b) for all 9 sets of coordinates (x, y, z) being on the list created in precomputation do
if (pn(x,y,z) = 0) and (A(x,y,z) 6= A←(x,y,z+n)) then candidate := false;
if (pn(x,y,z) = 1) and (A(x,y,z) = A
←
(x,y,z+n)) then candidate := false;
(c) if (candidate=true) then rotate back the guessed state by n bits and run 4-round
Keccak-512 on it to check whether the state is the preimage of a given hash.
The main loop of the 4-round preimage attack on Keccak-512 is very similar to the 3-round
variant, they differ only in a few places. In Step 2 of the pseudo-code instead of running a normal,
full 4-round Keccak-f [1600], we run the modified version without ι (in all 4 rounds) up to χ
in the 4th round. Finally, there will two times more false positive candidates as there are only
9 triples (x, y, z) for which pn(x,y,z) = 0 or p
n
(x,y,z) = 1. The complexity of the attack stays the
same as in the 3-round attack. That is 2256 (checking special messages) + 2506 (main loop) +
2503 (checking false positive candidates), which is amounts roughly to 2506 evaluations of the
4-round Keccak-512.
For Keccak-512, the preimage attack is better than the exhaustive search by a factor of 26.
The same gain can be achieved in the attack on Keccak-384. Our preimage attack works also on
Keccak-256 and Keccak-224 but the gain is slightly smaller for these variants. The reason is
that there are more false positive candidates to check. It is because an attacker knows fewer bits
of a hash (a hash is shorter in these variants) and hence there are fewer triples (x, y, z) (fewer
than in Keccak-512 and Keccak-384) for which pn(x,y,z) = 0 or p
n
(x,y,z) = 1. Consequently,
the complexities of the preimage attacks on Keccak-224 and Keccak-256 are 2221 and 2252,
respectively.
Please also note that if we try to attack Keccak variant with higher bitrate r (e.g. a variant
with r = 600, c = 1000, and a hash length equals 512), the claimed security for this variant is
2c/2 = 2500. In such a case our attack would not be actually an attack as its complexity is higher
than the claimed security provided by designers.
We could not extend the attack to 5 or more rounds because in the 5th round all pn(x,y,z) = 0.5,
while for the attack we need some pn(x,y,z) = 0 or p
n
(x,y,z) = 1.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented the rotational distinguisher for Keccak-f [1600] permutation
— the main building block of the Keccak hash function. The distinguisher has been enhanced
with the correlation analysis, allowing us to reach 5 rounds with the complexity of 212. We
have implemented and verified the distinguisher and experimental results have been consistent
with the theoretical model. A family of 4-round distinguishers helps us to mount the 4-round
preimage attack on Keccak-512 variant with the complexity of 2506. All the presented attacks
are valid for all the Keccak variants submitted as SHA-3 candidates. As future work, it would
be interesting to investigate whether the differential rebound attack could improve the rotational
distinguishers. These two types of analysis (rebound and rotational) were combined in the attacks
on Skein hash function [13].
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Analyzing the AND operation we consider two pairs of input bits. A pair from an A state and
its counterpart from an A← state. There are 16 possible combinations of pairs and we group
them in fours. We assume that all pairs of bits inside the groups are uniformly distributed. It
is shown in Figure 5. Probabilities of getting the given group are also shown. The most inner
circles represents pair of output bits (one bit from an A state and its counterpart from an A←
state). It is clear from Figure 5 that four paths lead to a circle with output bits having opposite
values (pairs (0,1) and (1,0)). Actually, one path has probability 0 thus a calculation of Pout
(a probability that output bits have opposite values) comes down to adding probabilities of the
three paths. We have:
Pout = papb · 1
2
+ (1− pa)pb · 1
2
+ (1− pb)pa · 1
2
=
1
2
(pa + pb − papb)
Fig. 5. All possible ‘paths’ for the bitwise AND operation for rotational pairs of bits.
1,1
0,0
1,1
1,1
0,0
0,0
0,0
1,1
0,1
1,1
1,0
1,1
0,1
0,0
1,0
0,0
1,0
1,0
1,0
0,1
0,1
0,1
0,1
1,0
1,1
1,0
1,1
0,1
0,0
1,0
0,0
0,1
(1-p )a
pa pb
p
b (1-p )
b
p
a
(1-p )
a
(1-p )
b
1/2
1/2 1/2
1/2
0,0
1,1
0,1
1,0
1/2
1/20
1
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof of Lemma 2 is the same as for Lemma 1. The only difference is that now there are only
two paths leading to a circle with output bits having opposite values. It is shown in Figure 6.
We have:
Pout = (1− pa)pb · 1 + (1− pb)pa · 1 = pa + pb − 2papb
Fig. 6. All possible ‘paths’ for the bitwise XOR operation for rotational pairs of bits.
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1
Probability of relation preservation by χ
We are given two pairs of bits (A(1,2,43), A
←
(1,2,44)) and (A(2,0,16), A
←
(2,0,17)). Each of these two
pairs has the relation between its bits (that is bits have either the same or opposite values). We
can also look at relation between pairs and there are two possibilities: either the same relation in
both pairs or different relation in each pair. For example a pair (0,1) and a pair (1,0) means that
relations in both pairs is the same (bits are different in pairs). We are interested in a probability
that χ preserves the relation between pairs. χ changes the values of bits in the following way.
A(1,2,43) := A(1,2,43) XOR (A(2,2,43) AND A(3,2,43))
A←(1,2,44) := A
←
(1,2,44) XOR (A
←
(2,2,44) AND A
←
(3,2,44))
}
first rotational pair
A(2,0,16) := A(2,0,16) XOR (A(3,0,16) AND A(4,0,16))
A←(2,0,17) := A
←
(2,0,17) XOR (A
←
(3,0,17) AND A
←
(4,0,17))
}
second rotational pair
To keep the relation between bits A(1,2,43) and A
←
(1,2,44) from the first pair, the result of the
AND operation has to be the same in both equations from the first pair. The probability of such
event can be calculated from Figure 5. We add probabilities (paths) leading to the left, inner
circle. (This circle represents the output bits with the same values.) Then a probability is:
P = (1− pa)(1− pb) · 1 + papb · 1
2
+ (1− pa)pb · 1
2
+ (1− pb)pa · 1
2
In the 5th round, after θ all pn(x,y,z) =
1
2 , then a numerical value of p is:
P = (1− 1
2
)(1− 1
2
)1 +
1
2
1
2
1
2
+ (1− 1
2
)
1
2
1
2
+ (1− 1
2
)
1
2
1
2
=
5
8
For the second rotational pair calculations are exactly the same with the result of 58 . The
event that χ preserves the relation between the first and second pair can happen either when
the relation in each pair is preserved or the relation in each pair is spoilt. Thus the probability
of this event is equal to:
Pevent =
5
8
· 5
8
+ (1− 5
8
)(1− 5
8
) =
34
64
= 0.53125
Values of fixed bits in the distinguisher from Section 3.3
Bits given in tables below are set to 1. All other fixed bits which are not listed below (but are
marked as fixed in Figure 4) are set to 0.
Bit Value
A(4,4,50) 1
A(4,4,51) 1
A←(4,4,51) 1
A←(0,2,21) 1
A←(0,3,21) 1
A←(0,0,22) 1
A←(0,2,22) 1
A←(0,3,22) 1
A←(0,4,22) 1
A←(2,0,20) 1
A←(2,3,20) 1
A←(2,2,21) 1
Bit Value
A←(2,3,21) 1
A←(3,2,51) 1
A←(3,3,51) 1
A←(3,0,50) 1
A←(3,3,50) 1
A←(3,0,52) 1
A←(3,2,52) 1
A←(3,3,52) 1
A←(3,4,52) 1
A←(0,2,51) 1
A←(0,3,51) 1
As a consequence of such settings, after pi some bits have also fixed (known) values. Specif-
ically, A(1,0,0) and A(1,0,1) with their rotational counterparts are equal to 0. Also A(4,0,0) and
A(4,0,1) with their rotational counterparts are fixed, equal to 1. With this known values we are
sure that the non-linear χ changes the states into the desirable rotational relation, as shown in
Figure 4.
Calculation of a number of special messages
According to Definition 1 and Remark 1, for a given state A there are up to 64 possible rota-
tional pairs (including an identity function). There are some messages which have fewer than 64
rotations. These special messages must have a cyclic pattern (e.g. alternating four 1’s and four
0’s) in all lanes. All 0’s or all 1’s in the given lane are also considered cyclic here. Please note
that if at least one lane in a state A is not cyclic then there are exactly 64 possible rotational
pairs (A, A←). It is because this non-cyclic lane is distinct for each rotational number n and
consequently the whole A← will be distinct.
For a 64-bit lane there are 232 cyclic patterns. In our preimage attack there are 8 unknown
lanes in the A state (remaining lanes are fixed and cyclic), so the number of combinations of
cyclic patterns in these 8 lanes is: 232 · 232 . . . · 232︸ ︷︷ ︸
8 factors
= 2256. And hence the number of special
messages is 2256.
Evolution of probabilities pn(x,y,z) in the modified Keccak variant
Figure 7 shows how probabilities pn(x,y,z) change in the modified Keccak variant (without ι).
The variant was used in 4-round preimage attack. Please note that in the 4th round, after θ,
there are still pn(x,y,z) = 0 or p
n
(x,y,z) = 1 which is the key observation for the 4-round preimage
attack.
Fig. 7. Evolution of probabilities pn(x,y,z) in the modified Keccak variant.
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